Introduction
In recent years, economists have begun to describe and quantify the impacts of business and social networks on international trade. In an international environment where contracts are not always enforceable and product information is imperfect, relationships between buyers and sellers matter. In some countries and cultures, they seem to matter more than in others. While examples of such relationships or networks can be found throughout history (e.g., the 11 th century Maghribi traders studied by Greif, 1993) , most economists have focused on networks that impact trade today. Japanese keiretsu and overseas Chinese networks are often cited as .The author thanks the conference participants, particularly Keith Head and John Ries, and discussant KC Fung for helpful comments and the East-West Center for providing funding and research accommodations during the early stages of this project. * Email address: greaney@hawaii.edu
Data details
Other papers on network effects on trade have developed proxy measures of cross-border networks using immigration flows (Gould (1994) , Head and Ries (1998) ), population shares (Rauch and Trindade (2002) ) or colonial ties and distance (Rauch (1999) ). I use a more direct measure of network effects by disaggregating U.S. trade with eight trade partners into trade by American-owned firms versus trade by foreign affiliates located in the United States. 3 Networks between affiliates and suppliers or buyers in their home countries would tend to create a home bias in their trade patterns. 2 Reverse imports are imports from overseas affiliates of that country's own firms. 3 The distinction between American-owned and foreign affiliate follows the Bureau of Economic Analysis definition, where a foreign affiliate (or "U.S. affiliate of foreign direct investors") involves foreign direct investment (FDI). FDI occurs when "a single foreign person owns or controls, directly or indirectly, 10% or more of the voting securities or an equivalent interest". (Bureau of Economic Analysis, 1997) Tables 1 and 2 show summary statistics on the activities of foreign affiliates by country of ultimate beneficial owner (UBO) in 1987 and 1997. 4 Since bilateral trade data for subsequent tables are available for only eight specific countries' affiliates, I focus on these countries along with presenting some regional totals in these tables. Japan stands out as early as 1987 for having the highest number of affiliates and these affiliates had the largest total assets, expenditures for property, plant and equipment, sales, and by far the highest level of participation in exporting and importing of any of the countries' affiliates. By 1997, Japanese affiliates maintained their lead in all of these categories and had surpassed Canadian and British affiliates in the number of companies consolidated and in gross property, plant and equipment. Again, the strongest difference between the Japanese affiliates and their other foreign counterparts is the much larger volume of exports and imports generated by the Japanese affiliates-$52.5 billion in exports and $120.7 billion in imports versus the next highest trade figures of $14.5 billion in exports for U.K.
Activities of foreign affiliates
affiliates and $15.3 billion in imports for Canadian affiliates. This large gap might be explained by a preponderance of Japanese affiliates involved explicitly in trade activities (i.e., trading companies). To investigate this possibility, I next examine evidence on the importing and exporting patterns of the affiliates by industry.
Tables 3-6 help to clarify the reasons for the high level of trade conducted by Japanese affiliates. Tables 3 and 4 show U.S. imports of goods shipped to affiliates by industry in 1987 and 1997. In 1987, $68.2 billion or 93.9% of the imports of Japanese affiliates were shipped to affiliates involved in wholesale trade, particularly those engaged in motor vehicles and equipment trade (45.5%). Only German affiliates appeared similar in having a large share of their imports (71.5% or $12.3 billion) going to affiliates in wholesale trade, particularly to those in autos and auto parts trade (53.9%). In contrast, only 5.8% ($4.2 billion) of Japanese affiliates' imports went to manufacturing affiliates, while 25.0% (German) to 60.3% (Australian) of the other eight countries' affiliates went to manufacturing affiliates in 1987. By 1997, the dominant importing role of Japanese wholesale trade affiliates had lessened somewhat, to 68.2% ($82.3 billion) of imports, with only 24.7% for autos and auto parts affiliates, while importing by manufacturing affiliates rose to 31.1% of the total. To examine how important foreign affiliates' trade activities are relative to U.S. total trade, I disaggregate bilateral trade into affiliates' trade and U.S. firms' trade in Table 7 . By far, foreign affiliates play the largest role in U.S. trade with Japan. In 1987, affiliates accounted for 61.6% of U.S. exports to Japan and 78.2% of U.S. imports from Japan, while the comparable figures for affiliates' share of total U.S. trade were 17.4% and 34.4%, respectively. In 1997, affiliates' share of U.S. exports to Japan was a much lower 47.4% while their import share from Japan was slightly higher at 82.7%. The shares for affiliates' in U.S. total trade were 19.2% and 29.6%, respectively. Next to Japan, foreign affiliates played the largest role in U.S. imports from Germany (52.6%) and Switzerland (62.6%) in 1997.
The dominant role that foreign affiliates played in U.S. trade with Japan remains the largest outlier in Table 7 . To connect these figures to the potential role of Japanese trading companies and/or intra-firm trade by Japanese multinationals, I need to identify what portion of U.S. trade with Japan is generated by Japanese affiliates in the United States, rather than by all foreign affiliates, as in Table 7 . The first two columns of Table 8 answer this question. Japanese affiliates exported 51.2% of total U.S. exports to Japan in 1987 and 38.5% in 1997, much higher percentages than the 0.5% to 13.7% range for the selected other countries' affiliates. In importing, foreign affiliates accounted for even larger shares of bilateral trade with their individual home countries and Japanese affiliates again accounted for the largest shares.
Japanese affiliates were responsible for 76.3% and 80.7% of U.S. imports from Japan in 1987 and 1997, while the next highest levels of affiliate control of importing from their home countries were the 51.5% and 47.0% figures attributed to German affiliates in 1987 and 1997.
By changing the denominator, the next two columns of Table 8 show the degree of home bias in the exporting and importing activities of the foreign affiliates. In 1987, Japanese affiliates had by far the highest degree of home bias in their exporting, at 77.3%. The next highest degree of home bias in exporting was only 30.7% for Canadian affiliates. In 1997, Japanese affiliates' home bias in exporting fell to 51.8%, just below the 52.3% posted by Canadian affiliates. Japanese affiliates had an extremely high degree of home bias in importing in 1987, 93.1%, although this was not too much higher than the home bias shown by West German affiliates (82.5%) and Canadian affiliates (73.4%). The home bias of Japanese affiliates in importing fell to 81.1% in 1997, below that of Canadian affiliates (85.6%) but the Canadian affiliates face much lower transportation costs in importing from home.
The next two columns of Table 8 compare the home bias of affiliates with the trade pattern of U.S. firms. The numbers result from the following calculation:
where i k X are the exports from (imports to) country k affiliates to (from) country i and i US X are the exports from (imports to) U.S. firms to (from) country i. The numerator represents the home bias of affiliates from country k. The denominator represents the tendency of U.S. firms to trade with country k among all other trade partners.
Any degree of network effects would tend to raise these ratios to levels above one, indicating that on average foreign affiliates have a greater tendency to trade with their particular home country than does a U.S. firm. Higher ratios indicate even larger divergences between the trading behavior of the foreign affiliates and the U.S. firms. In terms of exporting in 1987, Japanese and Swiss affiliates had the highest home bias divergence from U.S. firms' export pattern, with ratios of 14.9 and 15.2, respectively. The decline in Japanese affiliates' export home bias in 1997 is reflected in a lower ratio of 8.3, meaning Japanese affiliates on average favor Japan over other export destinations 8 times more than do U.S. firms on average. That
year, Australian and Swiss affiliates posted higher ratios of 9.95 and 19.4, respectively. In importing, although Japanese affiliates displayed very high levels of home bias in importing in 1987 and 1997, their tendency to buy from Japan did not diverge as much from U.S. firms' importing patterns as did the home bias displayed by several other countries' affiliates. Five of the other seven countries' affiliates had higher ratios than Japan's 13.2 in 1987, and three had higher ratios than Japan's 24.3 in 1997. Overall, the statistics in these two columns of Table 8 indicate tremendous divergence between the trade pattern of U.S. firms and that of foreign affiliates with respect to their home countries. This provides suggestive evidence of the strength of network effects in the activities of foreign affiliates in the United States.
The final two columns of Table 8 focus specifically on intra-group trade tendencies of affiliates, without regard to whether the other group firms are located in the home country or elsewhere. Japanese affiliates appear to have a somewhat higher intra-group export bias of 53.2% and 60.6% in 1987 and 1997 than do Canadian or European affiliates, which averaged between 17% and 50%. Japanese affiliates showed an even stronger preference for purchasing imports from within their corporate groups, 79.0% in 1987 and 79.7% in 1997. However, several of the other countries' affiliates showed even stronger intra-group biases in importing-West German (86.9%) affiliates in 1987, and Canadian (85.4%), German (80.7%) and Swiss (80.9) affiliates in 1997.
Overall, the descriptive statistics provide evidence that foreign affiliates have strong biases towards trade with their home countries. This evidence is consistent with a hypothesis that national business networks matter for international trade. The descriptive evidence is more mixed regarding the particular strength of Japanese networks. Japanese affiliates have much higher home biases in their exporting and importing activities than do most European affiliates.
The high home biases in the trade activities of Japanese affiliates are matched only by Canadian affiliates, whose home trade biases are supported by low transportation costs. However, in comparing the trade patterns of the foreign affiliates to those of U.S.-owned firms, Japanese affiliates are not such outliers. Australian and a few European affiliates showed greater divergence in their trade patterns relative to U.S. firms than did Japanese affiliates.
Gravity model estimates of network effects
To further explore the role of networks in international trade, I adopt a gravity model to examine the determinants of U.S. bilateral trade involving foreign affiliates in the United States.
For my gravity estimation, I adapt Feenstra's (2002) gravity equation to meet the needs of my data. Feenstra (2002) uses the following basic equation:
where ij X represents exports from country i to country j, i Y and j Y represent the GDP's of countries i and j, 1 ij dist is the distance between the two trading countries, and 1 
Vector z includes two different variables designed to capture average network effects and country-specific network variables to capture extraordinary network effects. "HomeLink" is a dummy variable that takes on the value of one if the affiliates' country of UBO matches the trade partner. The coefficient reflects the tendency for the affiliate to trade with, either import from or export to, its home country. The "dist2" variable measures the kilometer distance between the affiliates' trade partner and their country of UBO. If the trade partner matches the country of UBO, dist2 takes on the value of one to avoid taking the natural log of zero. The HomeLink variable measures network effects in a discrete manner, while the dist2 variable measures it as a continuous variable. The dist2 variable is particularly noteworthy because it represents a new way of measuring networks effects that is completely separate from any type of trade costs since the observations do not involve trade between the affiliates' country of UBO and their trade partner. 5 An affiliate's most direct business network may be its link with its parent company or group in its home country, measured by the HomeLink variable. The affiliate may also be linked into the parent's business network, which presumably is strongest in the vicinity of the parent company and grows weaker as one moves further away from the parent location (i.e., the affiliate's country of UBO). A negative and significant coefficient on the dist2 variable would reflect the affiliate's tendency to trade less with buyers and sellers located farther away from its country of UBO. bilateral trade was reported as zero were dropped to avoid taking the natural log of zero. These data problems resulted in 118 observations for 1997, out of 128 potential observations. Column
(1) in Table 9 shows that after normalizing each bilateral trade flow by the trade partner's income level, the trade distance (dist1) explains 95.8% of the remaining variation in the dependent variable. The -0.944 estimated coefficient implies that a 10% increase in distance between the United States and the source or destination country results in 9.44% less trade.
Adding the network variables further improves the fit of the gravity model, with highly significant estimated coefficients of the expected sign on these variables, as shown in Columns
(2)-(4) in Table 9 . Column (2) in Table 9 shows an estimated coefficient of 3.033 on the discrete HomeLink variable. This means that after controlling for distance and income effects, affiliates trade a tremendous 20.8 6 times more with their home countries than with other countries.
Measuring network effects with a continuous variable, dist2, produced a significant coefficient of -0.323, as shown in column (3). In other words, a 10% increase in the distance between the affiliates' home country and the trade partner implies 3.77% less trade. To isolate the proximity effect from the home-link effect, the coefficient on dist2 is estimated again after dropping all observations of home-linked trade (i.e., where ln(dist2)=0 The last column in Table 9 adds to the basic gravity equation a Japan-network dummy variable, along with the HomeLink variable described above. The Japan-network dummy takes the value of one when trade involves Japanese affiliates exporting to Japan or importing from Japan. The estimated coefficient on Japan-network just misses the 5% significance level (at 5.2%), but is quite large. Allowing for a slightly generous interpretation of significance, the Japan-network coefficient suggests that Japanese affiliates tend to trade with their home country much more than do the affiliates from other countries. The positive, significant coefficient on the HomeLink variable can be interpreted as the average tendency among all affiliates to trade with their home countries. Controlling for distance and incomes, affiliates on average traded 16.14 times more with their home countries, while Japanese affiliates traded an additional 7.65 times more with Japan in 1997. Since these effects are multiplicative, Japanese affiliates traded 123 (16.14*7.65) times more with Japan than would be predicted based on income and distance.
This result supports the hypothesis that Japanese affiliates tend to have particularly strong network links with their home country. The 1997 data also were used to check if adding a country-specific network dummy for any of the other seven countries of UBO would produce a significant coefficient, as in Japan's case, but no other significant coefficients were found.
Repeating the gravity estimates using 1987 and 1992 data produced very similar results to those reported in Table 9 , so these results are not separately reported. However, the one difference in results is that the Japan-network coefficient is significant at the 1% level for these years. I pooled the data from all three years (n=333) and confirmed that there are no significant time trends in the coefficients. The results of the gravity model estimates with the pooled data are shown in Table X . Almost all of the networks variables are significant at the 1% level and of the expected sign. The results in column (2) show that affiliates on average traded 19.7 times more with their home countries than with other trade partners, controlling for income and distance effects. Columns (3) and (4) show estimated coefficients on the dist2 parameter with and without the influence of the home-linked observations. As expected, both the level of significance and the absolute value of the coefficient decline when the latter observations are dropped. However, the result in column (4) implies that a 10% increase in distance from an affiliate's home country means .84% less trade with that trade partner, having already controlled for trade distance and partner income.
Columns (5) and (6) of Table X show the Japan-network effect. On top of an average tendency by all affiliates to trade 14.4 times more with their home countries, Japanese affiliates traded an additional 9.86 time more with Japan, as shown in column (5). In total, Japanese affiliates traded 142.4 times more with Japan than would be expected based on income and distance alone. Using the pooled data, the seven other countries were tested for extraordinary network effects (i.e., beyond those captured by the HomeLink dummy variable). Two countries had results significant at the 1% level, while the others had no significant results even at the 10% level. The United Kingdom-network and Australia-network coefficients were estimated at 0.724 and -2.584, on top of HomeLink estimates of 2.995 and 3.104, respectively. This means that U.K. affiliates traded slightly more with the United Kingdom than the average affiliate home bias, while Australian affiliates traded substantially less with Australia than the average affiliate home bias. Since these two countries' affiliates, along with Japanese affiliates, deviated significantly in their home trade bias from the average, the last regression results in Table X report the gravity  model estimates when all three countries are included as country-specific network dummy variables along with the HomeLink dummy variable. These results show that foreign affiliates from Canada, France, Germany, the Netherlands and Switzerland tended to trade on average 17.5 times more with their respective home countries than would be predicted by distance and income alone, while Australian affiliates traded only 1.5 (17.46*0.087) times more with Australia.
Controlling for distance and income effects, affiliates from the United Kingdom traded 29.5 (17.46*1.69) times more with the United Kingdom, while Japanese affiliates traded 129.7 (17.46*7.43) times more with Japan.
In sum, although the affiliates from all of the countries tended to trade more with their home countries than would be predicted by distance and income alone, the extremely strong tendency of Japanese affiliates to trade with Japan dwarfs the estimated network effects found for the other countries' affiliates. Japanese affiliates traded approximately 130 times more with Japan than expected, while most of the other countries' affiliates traded only 17 times more with their home countries. The only other affiliates with above average network strength were U.K.
affiliates, which tended to trade with the United Kingdom about 30 times more than expected.
These results support the conclusion that Japanese affiliates are distinctive in terms of the strength of their home trade bias.
Conclusions
Descriptive statistics and gravity model evidence support the conclusion that network effects strongly influence the trade pattern of foreign affiliates in the United States. Affiliates from all of the eight countries examined had much higher tendencies to trade with their home countries than did U.S. firms trade with those same countries. The home country bias was particularly strong for importing by many of the countries' affiliates. Using gravity equations with both discrete and continuous variables to measure network linkages between affiliates and their home countries, I obtain coefficients that are highly significant and of the expected sign.
Affiliates have a tremendously higher tendency to engage in trade with their home countries than with other countries. Controlling for distance, income and extraordinary home bias effects, affiliates on average tended to trade 17 times more with their home countries than with other countries, using the pooled data from 1987, 1992 and 1997.
Using a continuous variable to measure network effects, I find that affiliates tend to trade less with countries that are located further from their home countries. The distance between an affiliate's home country and its trade partner is introduced as a new method of measuring network effects that is completely separate from transportation and other trade costs. I find that a 10% increase in this distance lowers trade by 3.05% when a country's home trade bias is included or by 0.84% without this bias. The latter effect measures the tendency of foreign affiliates in the United States to trade with partners located close to their home country, after controlling for income and trade distance effects.
Both descriptive measures and gravity model estimates indicate that Japanese affiliates have an even higher tendency to trade with their home country than do the affiliates of the other seven countries. Using pooled trade data for years 1987, 1992 and 1997, I find that Japanese affiliates traded a whopping 130 times more with Japan than would be predicted by income and distance effects alone, while foreign affiliates from five of the other seven industrialized countries traded on average only 17 times more with their respective home countries. Affiliates from the United Kingdom were the only others to report a significant stronger-than-average home bias using the gravity model. They traded 30 times more with the United Kingdom than would be predicted by distance and income alone. Australian affiliates displayed a lower-than-average tendency to trade with their home country, trading 1.5 times more than expected based on distance and income. I find no evidence to support a conclusion that the strength of network effects or Japan-specific network effects has changed over time.
Japanese affiliates in the United States are found to participate more in trade and to have stronger home bias in their trade pattern than do the other countries' affiliates. These results suggest that Japanese business networks have stronger impacts on U.S. trade than do the networks of other industrialized countries' multinational firms. Strong trade networks may enhance trade opportunities for network "insiders" but hinder them for "outsiders". This may lead to greater trade friction with countries that have stronger trade networks. This hypothesis regarding the potential link between trade networks and trade policy is not analyzed in this study.
However, the results regarding the distinctive strength of Japanese trade networks may help in explaining Noland's (1997) finding that Japan is targeted disproportionately (after controlling for country size) in U.S. unilateral trade actions. Notes: Dist1 = distance between source and destination countries of trade; Dist2 = distance between non-US source or destination country and affiliates' country of UBO; HomeLink = a binary variable that takes on a value of 1 if the trade is between foreign affiliates and their home country; Japan-network = a binary variable that takes on a value of 1 if trade is between Japanese affiliates and Japan; indicates significance at the 10% level; * indicates significance at the 5% level; ** indicates significance at the 1% level; Standard errors shown in parentheses; exponent of coefficient shown in brackets.
Independent variables:
Gravity model results on foreign affiliates' trade by country of UBO with 8 major trade partners, 1997 Notes: Dist1 = distance between source and destination countries of trade; Dist2 = distance between non-US source or destination country and affiliates' country of UBO HomeLink = a binary variable that takes on a value of 1 if the trade is between foreign affiliates and their home country; Japan-network = a binary variable that takes on a value of 1 if trade is between Japanese affiliates and Japan; UK-network and Australia-network variables are defined similarly; indicates significance at the 10% level; * indicates significance at the 5% level; ** indicates significance at the 1% level; Standard errors shown in parentheses; exponent of coefficient shown in brackets. Table 10 Gravity model results on foreign affiliates' trade by country of UBO with 8 major trade partners, pooled data for years 1987, 1992, 1997 

